We present a secure communication protocol which allows asymptotically secure key distribution. Using quantum nonlocality, information is transferred in a deterministic manner. The security of this protocol is based on the 'High fidelity implies low entropy'. The experimental realization of the protocol is feasible with relatively small effort.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a protocol which is provably secure, by which private bit can be created between two parties over a public channel. Based on the postulate of quantum measurement [1] and no-cloning theorem [2] , different QKD protocol are presented [3] [4] [5] [6] . However, these type of cryptographic schemes are usually nondeterministic. A Beige et al. have presented a quantum communication [7] which allows secure direct communication. In Ref. [8] , a 'ping-pong' protocol has been presented, where the message is transmitted in a deterministic and direct manner. In this paper, we present a communication scheme, that allows for deterministic communication based on the quantum nonlocality. The security of is protocol is based on the 'High fidelity implies low entropy'. The basis idea of this protocol, establishing a secure key distribution using quantum nonlocality, has been raised by Ekert [4] . In this paper, we follow this idea, but give a deterministic QKD protocol instead of a nondeterministic manner.
Quantum entanglement is a uniquely quantum mechanical resource that plays a key role in many of the most interesting applications of quantum computation and quantum information. Suppose Alice has two photons prepared in a Bell's state
It is well known this single state can be used to establish nonlocal correlations over a spacelike interval, but these correlation cannot be used for superluminal communication [9] . Alice sends one of the photon, say A, to Bob, and keeps another. If Bob performs a measurement on the qubit A in the basis B Z = {|0 >, |1 >}, then the single state will collapse immediately to a product state and the entanglement does not exist. If Bob obtains |0 > by his measurement, when Alice performs a measurement on his photon in the basis B Z , Alice will obtain |1 >. If Bob obtains |1 >, then Alice will obtain |0 >. But what Bob obtains is random with a probability p = 0.5. So Bob can gain nothing about Alice's information only with a local measurement on his photon. To successfully transmit message from Alice to Bob, a reliable public channel is required. After Bob received the qubit Alice sent, he performs a measurement in basis B Z . Then he sends a single to Alice through public channel (This can be called as Bob ′ s receipt.). When Alice receives Bob's receipt, she performs a measurement in basis B Z on the photon she keeps. Suppose Alice gets |0 >, then she knows Bob's measurement result is |1 >. If Alice want to transmit a logical "0" to Bob, then she 'say no' to Bob through public channel. If Alice want to transmit a logical "1", then she 'say yes' to Bob through public channel. And Bob will get Alice's code when he compares his measurement result with Alice's public message. Also, when Alice's measurement result is |1 >, she can use the same method described above to transmit a classical bit to Bob together with a public channel. As the same as the 'ping-pong' protocol [8] , there are two modes, "message mode " and "control mode" here. By default, Alice and Bob are in message mode and communicate the way described above. With probability c, Bob switches to control mode. In control mode. After Bob received the qubit Alice sent, he performs a measurement randomly (with a probability p = 0.5) in the basis
Using public channel, he sends the result to Alice. When Alice receives the result, she also switches to control mode and performs a measurement in the same basis Bob used. Alice compares her result with Bob's result. If both results coincide, Alice knows that an eavesdropper-Eve is in the line and stops the communication. Else, this communication continues. This protocol can be described explicitly like this:
(1) Alice prepares two qubit in the Bell state |ψ − >. (2) Alice sends one of the qubit to Bob and keeps another. (3) Bob receives the qubit. With probability c, he switches to the control mode (4c). Else, she performs the message mode (4m).
(4c) Bob performs a measurement on his qubit randomly in the basis B X or B Z and tells Alice the result through public channel. Alice then performs a measurement in the same basis Bob used. If she finds both results coincided, then she stops the communication. Else, this communication continues.
(4m) Bob performs a measurement in the basis B Z . Then he sends his receipt to Alice through public channel. Alice then performs a measurement in the basis B Z . When Alice wants to transmit a logical "0" to Bob, if her result is |1 >, she 'say yes' to Bob through public channel, else, she 'say no' to Bob. When Alice wants to transmit a logical "1" to Bob, if her result is |0 >, she 'say yes' to Bob through public channel, else, she 'say no' to Bob. After this, Alice sends next qubit to Bob.
(5) When all of Alice's information is transmitted, this communication is successfully terminated. We will give a security proof below. There are four states in the Bell's basis, |ψ
Clearly, when Alice and Bob both use the basis B Z , their measurement result will coincide every time if their states are |φ + > or |φ − >. When Alice and Bob both use the basis B X , their measurement result will coincide if their state is |ψ + >. If and only if their state is |ψ − >, the measurement will not coincide. Since Bob selects the measurement basis randomly in control mode, the detection probability d is at least d ≥ 0.5 when their state is one of {|ψ + >, |φ ± >}. In order to be practical and secure, a QKD scheme must be based on existing-or nearly existing-technology, but its security must be guaranteed against an eavesdropper whose technology is limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics [10] . In this protocol, Eve's aim is to find out what Bob's measurement result is. Eve has no access to Alice's qubit. All that Eve can do is to attack Bob's qubit. For Eve, the qubit Alice sends to Bob is a complete mixed states, ρ A = 1 2 |0 >< 0| + 1 2 |1 >< 1| which is completely indistinguishable. Eve can uses all technique allowed by quantum laws to attack the qubit Alice sends to Bob. The most general quantum operation Eve can use is a completely positive map [11] . Suppose ε is a general quantum operation. Then it is possible to find out an ancilla, E, initially in a pure state |e >< e| uncorrelated with the system, a unitary U ,
After Eve's attack, the fidelity of states |ψ − > and ρ ′ is
Let us assume that
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Because of the completeness of the Bell's states, it has that the detection probability d is approximately dependent on the quantity γ, d ≥ 0.5γ. Let us consider the information Eve can gain when the fidelity of the states |ψ − > and ρ ′ is √ 1 − γ. 'High fidelity implies low entropy' [7, 11, 12] . If γ << 1, the von Neumann entropy
When γ = 0, which means that Eve can not be detected, no information Eve can gain on this condition. Because of F (|ψ − >, ρ) 2 = 1 − γ, then the entropy of ρ ′ is bounded above by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρ max with the diagonal entries 1 − γ, γ/3, γ/3, γ/3. The upper bound information that Eve can gain from ρ ′ is determinated by
Obviously, when γ = 0, i.e., Alice and Bob has zero probability to find Eve in line, the information that Eve can gain is zero. When Eve want to gain Alice's information, she has to face a nonzero risk that she was detected. When Eve want to get full of Alice's information, the function S(ρ max ) will get to its maximal value. Let δ(S(ρ max )) = 0, it has γ = 3 4 . The detection is d ≥ 3 8 on this condition. Since this von Neumann entropy is a continued function of γ, we know that the more information Eve want to gain, the bigger risk that Eve has to face. The information I 0 (d) Eve can gain in every message mode is approximately dependent on the detection probability d(I 0 ). Taking into account the probability c of a control run, the effective transmission rate is r = 1 − c. The probability of Eve's eavesdropping one message transfer without being detected is [8] 
where d is the detection probability in the control mode. After n protocol run, the probability to successfully eavesdrop
For c > 0, d > 0, this value decreases exponentially. In the limit n → ∞, we have s → 0. So this protocol is asymptotically secure. In principle, the security can arbitrarily be improved by increasing the control parameter c at cost of decreasing the transmission rate. In practice, we can use a small c, which will improves the efficiency of the communication. To realize a perfectly secure communication, we must abandon the direct transfer in favor of a key transfer [8] . Instead of transmitting the message directly to Alice, Bob will take a random sequence of N bits from a secret random number generator. After a successful transmission, the random sequence is used as a shared secret key between Bob and Alice. Bob and Alice can choose classical privacy amplification protocols, which make it very hard to decode parts of the message with only some of the key bits given. So Eve has virtually no advantage in eavesdropping only a few bits. When Eve is detected, the transfer stops. Then Eve has nothing but a sequence of nonsense random bits. In contrast to the 'ping-pong' protocol, the control mode in our protocol not only can keep this protocol from being eavesdropped and but also can protect it against a denial-of-service attack [13, 14] . In order to be practical and secure, a quantum key distribution scheme must be based on existing-or nearly existing-technology [10] . Experimental quantum key distribution was demonstrated for first time by Bennett, et al [15] . Since then, single photon source have been studied in recent years and a great variety of approaches has been proposed and implemented [16] . Today, several groups have shown that quantum key distribution is possible, even outside the laboratory. In principle, any two-level quantum system could be used to implement quantum cryptography. In practice, all implementations have relied on photons. The reason is that their decoherence can be controlled and moderated. The technological challenges of the quantum cryptography are the questions of how to produce single photons, how to transmit them, how to detect single photons, and how to exploit the intrinsic randomness of quantum processes to build random generators [17] . Considered the experimental feasibility of this protocol, the Bell state can be created by parametric down − conversion. And the values of σ x , σ y , and σ z of a qubit of an single photon can be ascertained [18] . Compared with quantum key distribution protocol such as BB84, this protocol provides a deterministic transmission, no qubits have to be discarded. In this protocol, a Bell measurement is not needed compared with the ping-pong protocol. The storage of one photon is necessary for a duration corresponding to about twice the distance between Alice and Bob.
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